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's objections
made, and the
thereto shall
or his counsel,
them to be
such '' Corrections
and the corhave been actually made,
the corrected reporter's tran-

Such peremptory writ of mandate shall also direct respondent court to transmit to the governor of California complete,
authenticated copies of the clerk's and reporter's transcripts
of the resettlement proceedings.
This order is final forthwith.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor,
Comb, J., concurred.

Spence, ,J., and Me-

Carter, J., concurred in the order.

F. No. 19635.

In Bank.

Oct. 14, 1958.]

CALIFORNIA GASOLINE RETAILERS (a Nonprofit Corporation) et al., Respondents, v. REGAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION OF PRESNO, INC. (a Corporation)
et al., Appellants.
[1] Lotteries-Constitutional Provision.-Const., art. IV, § 26, declaring that the Legislature shall have no power to authorize
lotteries or gift enterprises for any purpose and shall pass
laws to prohibit the sale of
or gift enterprise tickets
or tickets in any scheme in the nature of a lottery, shows a
legislative intention that lotteries are to be prohibited, but is
not a "self-enforcing" or "self-executing" provision.
[2] Parties- Suing on Behalf of All.-Code Civ. Proc., § 382,
authorizing
or class suits, is based on the doc[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Lotteries, § 2; Am.Jur., Lotteries, § 19 et seq.
§ 22 et seq.; Am.Jur., Parties, § 44
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d,
et seq.
McK. Dig. References:
Lotteries, § 1; [2-4] Parties, § 10; [5]
Pleading, § 192; [6] Pleading, § 185(7); [7] Pleading, § 175(1);
[8] Pleading, § 200;
16,
Lotteries, § 3; [15] Statutes,
§ 118.

Oct.

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

trine of virtual representation and
era] rule of
all mt;erest;eu.
codification
theory of convenience to
represent the rights of others
similarly situated who could be
in the controversy.
!d.-Suing on Behalf of AlL-To authorize a class proceeding
there must be a well-defined
of interest in the
questions of law and fact involved
the parties to
be represented.
!d.-Suing on Behalf of All.-A
having
members
in the
stations in a
certain area was not a proper
plaintiff in a representative or class suit to enjoin an
lottery
by three
groups of independent service station operators, where there
was no community of interest between plaintiff and its members and they were not "similarly situated" in view of the fact
that plaintiff was complaining of inability of its members to
pay dues and assessments, while the members were alleged to
have been injured by defendants through loss of business.
Pleading- Amendment- Inserting Names of Parties.-The
amendment of a complaint filed by a nonprofit corporation
to include an individual member of the corporation as a party
plaintiff had the effect of curing the original pleading naming
the corporation as party plaintiff, which was defective in that
the corporation was not authorized to bring the action in a
representative capacity in behalf of its members, who were engaged in the operation of gasoline stations in a certain area,
where the individual named in the amendment was a member
of the corporation and therefore "similarly situated" with
the other members.
!d.-Amendment-After Submission of Case.-A court may,
in its discretion, permit amendment of the pleadings after
the evidence is in, pending argument of counsel, and even after
submission of the cause.
!d.-Amendment-Liberality in Exercise of Power.-Thc statutory provision relating to amendments of pleadings in furtherance of justice (Code Civ. Proc., § 473) is liberally construed.
!d.-Amendment-To Conform to Proof.-It was not an abuse
of discretion to permit the amendment of a complaint improperly naming a nonprofit corporation as party plaintiff to
include an individual (the president and a member of the corporation) as plaintiff so th~ the pleadings would conform to

[9] Scheme for advertising or stimulating legitimate business as
a lottery, notes, 48 A.L.R. 1115; 57 A.L.R. 424; 103 A.L.R. 866;
109 A.L.R. 709; 113 A.L.R. 1121. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Lotteries,
§ 5; Am.Jur., Lotteries,§ 3.
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the proof, where the amendment stated no new cause of action
against defendants, did not state any new facts, and defendants were not prejudiced thereby.
[9] Lotteries-Elements.-Three elements must be present to constitute a lottery, namely, a prize, distribution by chance, and
consideration.
[10] Id.-Elements-Consideration.-An essential element of a
lottery is that a prize determined by chance be distributed
to a person who has paid a valuable consideration for the
chance of winning a prize, that is, one who has hazarded something of value on the chance.
[11] Id. - Elements - Consideration.-A "closed participation
scheme" is where those participating in the scheme have paid
a consideration for a chance to win the prize, while a "flexible
participation" type is where some have paid a consideration
and some have not.
[12] !d.-Elements-Consideration.-Where it clearly appears that
any person could have received a ticket or tickets free for the
asking or without a request and without the necessity of making any kind of purchase, the relative numbers of tickets distributed with and without purchases should not be determinative of the issue whether the holders of tickets paid or promised
to pay a valuable consideration for the chance of winning a
prize.
[13] Id.-Elements-Consideration.-The question of whether consideration has been paid for the chance of winning a prize is
not to be determined from the standpoint of the party distributing the prize tickets, but from that of the holders of the
tickets.
[14] Id.-Elements-Consideration.-In view of Pen. Code, § 319,
defining a lottery and providing that the consideration necessary is a "valuable one" paid or promised to be paid by the one
receiving the ticket, the fact that a ticket holder must go to
the place of business of the sponsor of the scheme to deposit
the ticket stub cannot be considered the necessary consideration.
[15] Statutes-Construction-Penal Statutes.-Penal statutes will
not be given application beyond their plain intent; they include
only those offenses coming clearly within the import of the
language.
[16] Lotteries- Elements- Consideration.-In determining the
consideration necessary to ~nstitute a promotion scheme a
lottery within the purview of Pen. Code, § 319, the definition
of consideration as found in Civ. Code, § 1605, will not be
accepted.
[17] Id.-What Constitutes a Lottery.-An advertising and promotional scheme operated by three groups of independent ser-
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vice station operators the members of which distributed tickets
for drawings for prizes did not fall within the definition of a
lottery as set forth in Pen. Code, § 319, because of lack of
consideration, where in all three groups prize tickets were
given free to anyone who asked for them and to many who did
not ask for them, the tickets were given to persons away from
the service stations, the receipt of the tickets was not dependent on purchase of merchandise or service, and the prize winning tickets were honored regardless of whether or not merchandise was purchased.

APPEAL from portions of a judgment of the Superior
Court of Fresno County. George M. DeWolf, Judge. Reversed.
Action to enjoin service station operators from engaging in
a give-away program alleged to constitute a lottery. Portions
of judgment for plaintiffs, reversed .
.A. E. Stebbings, C. Neil Ash, James D. Garibaldi, Frank
C. Lerrigo, Eckhart A. Thompson, Martin J. Weil, Brewster
L. Arms, Robert R. Rosson and A. Hugo Pearson for Appellants.
Eugene S. Clifford, Caspar \V. Weinberger, Heller, Ehrman,
White & McAuliffe, Philip C. Wilkins, Spencer E. Van Dyke,
Smith, Van Dyke & Hildreth, David F. Crossen and Thomas
B. Curtis as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants.
Rowell, Lamberson & Thomas, Milo E. Rowell, Richard Z.
Lamberson and Breekinridgc Thomas for Respondents.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Victor Griffith, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
CARTER, J.-The original plaintiff in this action for
injunctive relief was California Gasoline Retail0rs, a nonprofit California corporation consisting of members distributing the products of the major oil companies, Standanl Oil,
Shell Oil, Union Oil and others. The defendants, too numerous to name individually, are members of three groups of
independ(•nt service station operators. For convenience, they
have been, and will be, referred to as the Regal Group, the
Norwalk Group and the Beacon Group.
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some 60 of whose members were in the Fresno
area where this case arose,
suit
the defendants charging them with
away their products in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code,
17000-17101) with fraudulent and misleading advertising;
and with
a
in violation of sections 320, 321
and :322 of the Penal Code. The trial court found in favor
of defendants on the
unfair trade
but in favor of the
them with conducting
had been conrluded and both
parties had
made a motion for leave to
file an amendment to the
and to add one Philip M.
Hudson as a party
Hudson was p1'esident of plaintiff corporation and one of its members. Plaintiff's motion
was denied with the court
the right to alter its
ruling if it could be done without prejudice to the defendants. On the day the decision was
the court granted
plaintiff's motion to amend.
All defendants appeal, contending that ( 1) the plaintiff
corporation -vvas not a proper party plaintiff; (2) the court
abused its discretion in permitting the amendment and joinder
of Hudson as a plaintiff; (3) their
and merchandising program did not constitute a lottery as defined hy section 319 of the Penal Code; ( 4)
1vi1l not enjoin the
commission of a crime unless the activities constitute a public
nuisance, or direct pecuniary loss has been sustained by the
plaintiff.
[1] It is also contended that article IV, section 26, of the
California Constitution evidences a strong public policy
against lotteries in this state. That
so far as is here
pertinent, provides: ''The l;egislatnre shall have no power
to authorize lotteries or gift
for any purpose
and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale in this State of
lottery or gift enterprise tickets or tickets in any scheme in
the nature of a lottery." 'While the section just quoted shows
a legislative intention that lotteries are to be prohibited in
this state, it is obvious from the language thereof that it is
not a "self-enforcing" or "self-executing" provision such as
is found in article I, section 14, of the Constitution (Rose v.
State, 19 Cal.2d 713,720,721 []23 P.2d 305]). The language
shows that it >vas intended that the Legislature should have
no power to authorize lotteries hy legislation and that it was
to enact legislation prohibiting lotteries. It is also apparent
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from a reading of the provisions that a lottery is not defined.
Pnrsnant to the mandate of the just-quoted section, the Legislature has enacted legislation defining and prohibiting lotteries and these provisions are hereinafter discussed.
PLAINTIFF CoRPORATION As PROPER PARTY PLAINTIFF;*
JOINDER oF HunsoN As PARTY PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff corporation is composed of members who sell gasoline and other related products. Some 60-odd members reside
in Fresno County and there are others elsewhere in the state.
Plaintiff argues that it is a proper plaintiff by virtue of
section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides
that ''. . . when the question is one of a common or general
interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous,
and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.'' Defendants contend that there was no authorization to the
plaintiff corporation to bring the suit; that plaintiff corporation is not, itself, engaged in selling gasoline; that there are
more defendants than plaintiffs and that it would not be
impracticable to bring them before the court. It is true, as
stated by defendants, that the complaint does not allege that
plaintiff was authorized to bring the suit on behalf of its
members. It is alleged that plaintiff's members have suffered
loss of customers and loss of sales of gasoline and other
products and related commodities and ''have been injured in
their property and businesses . . . ''; that plaintiff will also
suffer injury and loss by ''reason of the inability of said members to pay dues and assessments and to participate as
members of Plaintiff Corporation."
In Haggerty v. County of Kings, 117 Cal.App.2d 470, 477
[256 P.2d 393], the court noted: "In the present case it is
alleged in the complaint that plaintiff is the secretary of the
California State Federation of Labor and has been authori.sed
to bring this action in a representative capacity; that the
Federation and its members are engaged in peaceful picketing; that the defendants have threatened to institute and are
instituting prosecution of such pickets and members under
the provisions of the two ordinances involved and that the
members of the Federation constitute a class similarly situated
with respect to the matters alleged. These allegations must
be accepted as true where, as here, the demurrer to the com*This point was presented to the trial eourt by special demurrer and
motion to dismiss.

850 CAL. GAs. RETAILERS v. REGAL PETROLEUM CoRP. [50 C.2d
plaint was sustained without leave to amend." (Emphasis
added.) It would appear that the court in the Haggerty case
considered an allegation as to authorization to bring the suit
necessary as well as an allegation to the effect that the members represented constituted a class similarly situated. There
are no such allegations in the complaint under consideration.
[2] It appears that the interest of plaintiff corporation and
its members may fall within the rule of Parker v. Bowron,
40 Cal.2d 344, 352, 353 [254 P.2d 6]: "The statutory provision [Code Civ. Proc., § 382] is based upon the doctrine
of virtual representation and is an exception to the general
rule of compulsory joinder of all interested parties. CW eaver
v. Pasadena Tounwment of Roses Assn., 32 Cal.2d 833, 837
[198 P.2d 514].) It is a codification of 'the common law
theory of convenience to the parties when one or more fairly
represent the rights of others similarly situated who could
be designated in the controversy.' (Fallon v. Superior Court,
33 Cal.App.2d 48, 50 [90 P.2d 858].) [3] '[R]egardless of
which of the alternative conditions of the statute is invoked
as authorizing a class proceeding, it has been uniformly held
that there must be a well-defined "community of interest"
in the questions of law and fact involved as affecting the
parties to be represented.' ( W cavcr v. Pasadena T01trnarnent
of Roses Assn., supra; Jellen v. O'Brien, 89 Cal.App. 505,
509 [264 P. 1115].)
"No facts have been alleged to bring Parker within this
well established rule regarding class suits. He does not claim
to be a member of the interested class, and there is nothing
to indicate that he is 'similarly situated' with those whom
he pretends to represent. There can be no 'common or general
interest' in the subject matter of the controversy (Weaver
v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Assn., S1tpra, p. 842) between Parker, who is not employed by the city, and city
employees. Parker cannot give himself standing to sue by
purporting to represent a class of which he is not a member.''
[4] In other words, if the rule of Parker v. Bowron, supra,
40 Ca1.2d 344, 352, 353, is strictly applied, there is no community of interest between plaintiff and its members and they
are not "similarly situated" since plaintiff is complaining of
the inability of its members to pay dues and assessments, and
the members are alleged to have been injured by defendants
through loss of business. It would thus appear that plaintiff
corporation is not a proper party plaintiff.
[5] The amendment to the complaint and the inclusion
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of Hudson as a party plaintiff have the effect of curing the
original defective pleading. Hudson is a member of plaintiff corporation and therefore "similarly situated" with the
other members. Section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, provides that "The court may, in furtherance of justice, and
on such terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any
pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name
of any party. . . . " [6] In Feigin v. Kntchor, 105 Cal.App.
2d 744, 747, 748 [234 P.2d 264], it was held that a court
may, in its discretion, permit amendment of pleadings after
the evidence is all in, pending argument of counsel, and even
after submission of the cause. [7] The statutory provision
relating to amendments to the pleadings in the furtherance
of justice has received a very liberal construction in the courts
of this state (Klopstock v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 13, 19
[108 P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 318]). [8] The amendment to
the complaint stated no new cause of action against the
defendants, nor did it state any new facts. It does not appear
that defendants were prejudiced thereby and the court did
not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment and
inclusion of Hudson as plaintiff so that the pleadings would
conform to the proof. (Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal.App.2d
435, 446 [261 P.2d 529] .)
ADVERTISING AND MERCHANDISING PROGRAM As LOTTERY

Section 319 of the Penal Code provides: ''A lottery is any
scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by chance,
among persons who have paid or promised to pay any valuable
consideration for the chance of obtaining such property or a
portion of it, or for any share or any interest in such property,
upon any agreement, understanding, or expectation that it is
to be distributed or disposed of by lot or chance, whether
called a lottery, raffle, or gift-enterprise, or by whatever name
the same may be known.''
[9] It is agreed by all parties that three elements must
be present to constitute a lottery: (1) a prize; (2) distributed
by chance ; and ( 3) consideration. All parties are also agreed
that the first two elements are present under the facts here
presented. It is the third element of consideration upon which
the parties differ.
Inasmuch as all three groups of defendants operated in
slightly different ways, the facts concerning their operations
will be set forth separately.

THE HEGAI, GROUP
The
operates three service stations in Presno
which conduct what is known as a
program as
part of a
and advertising scheme. Tickets were
distributed to the Regal stations for redistribution to the public. They were
to persons before any purchase of
or other service, or whether any sale was made; they
were distributed with the stubs attached from house to house;
they were distributed at drive-in theaters and at baseball
games. Those who received the tickets away from the stations
were
to go to one of the stations to deposit the ticket
stub. Rules for the drawing were posted in each Hegal station
and provided that any person over the age of 18 years would
receive, free of charge, an officially numbered ticket; that the
winner did not have to be present at the time of the drawing;
and that the winning numbers would be posted for a sevenday period at the Regal stations after the periodic drawings.
The prizes to be won consisted of an automobile, cash and
other personal property.
TuE NoRwALK GROUP
This, too, was a merchandising and advertising program
and these defendants advertised in the newspaper, over the
radio and by billboards that each month, commencing with
May, 1955, the Norwalk stations would give away three Buick
automobiles, and several household appliances. When this
program was initiated, the distributors, to defray the expenses
of the campaign, increased the price of gasoline to the retailers by one cent per gallon which increase was passed on
to the consumers. Those Norwalk dealers who did not choose
to participate in the program did not receive their gasoline
at the increased rate. The Norwalk tickets were given away
to anyone who asked for them regardless of whether any
product or service offered for sale was purchased ; tickets
were also distributed from house to house, and some 5,000
of them were placed under windshield wipers of cars parked
at the Fresno County Fair Grounds. One of the Norwalk
dealers testified that he gave more tickets for larger purchases and that he passed along the one-cent increase in his
cost of gasoline to the purchasers thereof. Another Norwalk
dealer testified that he gave tickets to those driving into his
station both before and after purchases. 'l'he ticket stubs
were required to be deposited in a receptacle in a Norwalk
station. There is evidence in the record that when Norwalk
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tickets were distributed mvay from the stations, the stubs were
first removed so that the recipient did not have to go into
the station to be eligible for one of the prizes. A drawing
was held once a month and the winning list was posted for
seven days at all Norwalk stations
in the program. If no claimant
to call for his
during
the seven-day
the prize was then awarded to the
winning number next in line. \Yritten rules were posted at
each participating station and provided
1) that ''Any
person who is 18 years of age or over will be given free, on
request, an official numbered ticket for any dravving. Giving
of such ticket is unconditional and does not depend on the
purchase of or payment for any merchandise or service."
THE BEACON GROUP

This was a similar advertising and merchandising operation entered into by the Beacon and Camino! Company in conjunction with United Stations, Inc., an association of gasoline
stations formed by the operators for the purpose of operating
give-away programs. Camino! did not raise the price of
gasoline to the dealers, but the dealers raised the price to the
consumer by one cent per gallon and then remitted the extra
one cent per gallon to Caminol to pay for the expenses and
advertising of the give-away program. Tickets were distributed away from the station, to those who made no purchases at the station, and to those who did. The tickets given
to persons away from the stations had the stubs attached
causing the recipients to go to the station to deposit them.
The rules provided that any person 18 years of age, or over,
would be given free, on request, an official numbered ticket
for any drawing; that the giving of the ticket was unconditional and did not depend on the purchase of any merchandise or services; that the winner did not have to be present
at the drawing and that all winning numbers would be posted
at the participating stations for a seven-day period. Drawings were held twice a month and prizcs were distributed to
those holding the winning tickets.
[10] In People v. Carclas, 137 Cal.App.Supp. 788, 790,
791 [28 P.2d 99], it was held that" An analysis of the section
[Pen. Code, § 319] and an examination of the authorities
construing it and other similar statutory provisions disclose
that there are three elements necessary to constitute a lottery.
These elements are: (1) The disposition of property, (2) upon
a contingency determined by chance, (3) to a person who has

854 CAL. GAs. RETAILERS v. REGAL PETROLEUM CoRP. [50 C.2d

paid a valuable consideration for the chance of winning the
prize, that is to say, one who has hazarded something of value
upon the chance. (People v. Hecht, 119 Cal.App.Supp. 778
[3 P.2d 399]; 17 R.C.L. 1222; 38 C.J. 289.)" (Emphasis
added.) In the Card as case the defendant was a motion picture theater operator. He advertised by means of programs,
newspapers, placards and on tbe theater screen that on a
certain date two fully paid round trip tickets to Santa Catalina Island would be given free to the holders of the lucky
tickets which were to be drawn on a certain evening. The
court stated the facts as follows: "The tickets were placed in
the hands of the public by the distribution in the vicinity of
the theater of five thousand theater programs, each containing
one of the tickets, and by handing two thousand tickets to
passing motorists. Also, an employee of the theater was
stationed between the street and the entrance to the theater,
who gave prize tickets to all who asked them, and offered
them to any person who approached within proximity of her.
No charge was made for any of these prize tickets, nor was it
necessary that an admission ticket to the theater be purchased.'' The winner was announced both inside and outside
the theater; stubs were deposited in a receptacle outside the
theater. The court noted that stubs were deposited there by
persons who purchased admission tickets, by those who were
admitted to the theater free of charge, and by others who did
not attend the show.
In the Cardas case, as in the one under consideration,
''Counsel for the People argue that patronage from the ticket
holders as a whole constituted consideration for the distribution of the prize even though the individual holders of tickets
had not parted with consideration for the individual ticket
held by them. This argument apparently proceeds upon the
theory that the element of consideration is established by
showing that the defendant received something of value in
return for the distribution of the prizes. The question of
consideration is not to be determined from the standpoint
of the defendant, but from that of the holders of the prize
tickets. The question is : Did the holders of prize tickets pay
a valuable consideration for the chance? Certainly those who
received prize tickets without buying an admission ticket did
not pay anything for the chance of getting the prize. They
did not hazard anything of value. It would then seem to
follow that those who purchased admission tickets and received
prize tickets, not at the box office but from another employee,
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could not be said to have paid a consideration for the prize
tickets since they could have received them free."
In People v. Carpenter, 141 Cal.App.2d 884, 887, 888, 889,
890 [297 P.2d 498] (hearing denied), a bank night drawing
was also involved. As an advertising technique to encourage
theater patronage, the operators of J_jakewood theater solicited
registrations from house to house and gave registration blanks
to people attending the theater who were asked if they would
like to register for the bank night. Registration blanks were
kept at the snack bar and sometimes at the box office and were
given to anyone who asked for them. A ticket containing
each number was put into a drum kept by the theater as the
name to which it was assigned was placed in the registration
book. Once a name was registered that person was eligible
to win at any bank night held thereafter. Bank nights were
held once a week and a ticket was drawn from the drum
and given to the manager who compared it with the registration book. The winning name was then announced over loudspeakers within and outside the theater and the person winning was given two minutes to reach the stage and identify
himself. Admission tickets were not necessary for persons
wishing to enter the theater to see and hear the bank night
drawing, or to go into the theater to claim the prize.
In the Carpenter case the court held that the element of
chance was lacking inm;much as under the facts of that case
Carpenter, who arranged to have himself chosen as the one
to draw the ticket, had palmed a ticket which he purported to
draw from the drum on the stage. This was done according
to a prearranged plan with two others. The court stated
the "initial question" to be "Was the bank night drawing
a lottery~" And after holding that the element of chance
was missing due to the fraud of Carpenter, continued: "We
come now to the third element in a lottery, viz: consideration
for the chance of winning the prize. The question of consideration is not to be determined from the standpoint of the
defendant, but from that of the holders of prize tickets. The
question is: Did the holders of prize tickets pay a valuable
consideration for the chance? Certainly those who received
prize tickets without buying an admission ticket did not pay
anything for the chance of getting the prize. They did not
hazard anything of value. It would then seem to follow that
those who purchased admission tickets and received prize
tickets, not at the box office but from another employee, could

[50 C.2d
a consideration for the
tickets
since
could have received them free.
"The court in the Cardas case, supra, relied
Cross v.
People, 18 Colo. 321
P. 821, 36 Am.St.Rep. 292]. In
discussing the element of consideration in a lottery, the Colorado Supreme Court stated: 'By the admitted facts it is
shown that the plaintiffs in error gave business cards which
entitled the holders to a chance on a piano, to be distributed
as the holders of such chances
elect. These tickets or
chances were given indiscriminately to persons, whether they
purchased
of plaintiffs in error or
to those who
registered their names at their shoe store, and to those who,
from a distance, sent the return postage. 'While it is admitted
that Charles Linton purchased goods to the amount of one
dollar at their store, and received one of these cards, it is
admitted that such purchase, or any purchase of goods, was
not a condition upon which the card was delivered. The fact
that such cards or chances were given away to induce persons
to visit their store with the expectation that they might purchase goods, and thereby increase their trade, is a benefit too
remote to constitute a consideration for the chances. Persons
holding these cards, although not present, were, equally with
those visiting their store, entitled to draw the prize. The
element of gambling that is necessary to constitute this a
lottery within the purview of the statute, to wit, the paying
of money, directly or indirectly, for the chance of drawing the
piano, is lacking, and the transaction did not constitute a
violation of the statute.' " In holding that the element of
consideration was also lacking the court had this to say:
"Certainly those who registered upon request of a solicitor
without attending the theater did not pay for the chance of
getting the prize; neither did those who later registered without purchasing an admission ticket. Those who purchased
admission tickets and then registered while they were at
the theater as patrons, cannot be said to have paid a consideration for the privilege of registering, as they could have
done so without buying an admission ticket. Once a person's
name was registered, it might be drawn at any bank night
thereafter, and it was not necessary that he purchase an admission ticket either to listen to or see the bank night drawing
or to claim the award if his name was called.
"It ther:fore follows, under the principles of the Cardas
case, supra, that no consideration was paid for the chance of
winning the bank night prize in the instant case."
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In the case at bar all three groups of defendants engaged
in the so-called give-away programs as an advertising scheme
and to bring new patronage to their service station. In all
groups, prize tickets were given away free to anyone who asked
for them, and to many who did not ask for them; in all groups
the tickets were given to persons away from the stations; in
all groups the receipt of the ticket or tickets was not dependent upon a purchase of merchandise or service and in all
groups the prize winning tickets were honored regardless of a
purchase of merchandise. The Norwalk and Beacon Groups
raised the price of gasoline one cent per gallon to the consumer in order to finance the advertising program. However,
in both of these groups tickets were given away free without
respect to the purchase of any gasoline or other related
products.
[11] The People, as amicus curiae, make the following
point: It is contended that there are two types of advertising
schemes-" closed participation" and "flexible participation.'' A closed participation scheme is where those participating in the scheme have paid a consideration for a chance to
win the prize; the flexible participation type is where some
have paid a consideration and some have not. As in the case
at bar, there were some customers of the gasoline stations
who received prize tickets after purchase of the products
offered for sale. and others who received the tickets at their
homes, or at other places, and paid for no merchandise. In
this latter connection, the argument is made that in all of the
groups the major part of the tickets went to those who made
purchases. It is pointed out that in People v. Gonzales, 62
Cal.App.2d 274, 278, 279, 285, 286 [144 P.2d 605), the
theater manager testified that one cash night prize ticket was
given to each patron who purchased a ticket when he purchased the ticket and another was given to him as he left the
theater. No tickets were distributed to persons who had not
purchased admission tickets. The court noted that ''There
was no general or indiscriminate distribution of the drawing
tickets to persons irrespective of whether they paid admission." The court, after discussing the Cardas case, supra
(137 Cal.App.Supp. 788), stated: "The decision in the
Cardas case was a proper determination upon the facts therein
that the drawing therein was not a lottery. That decision,
however, is not determinative or at all persuasive that the
drawing herein, involving facts vastly different from those
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therein, was not a lottery. The presence of certain facts in
that case, as to free distribution, and as to announcements
and participation outside the theater, was the basis for the
decision therein that the drawing was not a lottery, but in
this case those or similar facts are not present and an opposite
state of facts exists.'' From the court's statement that
''There was no general or indiscriminate distribution of the
drawing tickets to persons irrespective of whether they paid
admission" (emphasis added) the People argue that because
a lesser number of tickets in the case at bar were given to
persons away from the station and to those who made no
purchases that this was more like a closed participation scheme,
and hence a lottery, than it was the flexible participation
scheme which was found not to constitute a lottery in the
Cardas case.
[12] Since it clearly appears from the record that any
person could have received a ticket, or tickets, free for the
asking, or even without a request and without any necessity
of making any kind of purchase it would seem that the relative
numbers of tickets distributed with purchases or without
purchases should not be determinative of the issue involved
which is whether the holder, or holders, of the tickets paid,
or promised to pay a valuable consideration for the chance of
winning a prize. As the court stated in the Carpenter case,
supra (141 Cal.App.2d 884, 888): "It would then seem to
follow that those who purchased admission tickets and received prize tickets, not at the box office but from another
employee, could not be said to have paid a consideration for
the prize tickets since they could have received them free.''
Also, in the Carpenter case (p. 889), the court, quoting from
Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321 [32 P. 821, 36 Am.St.Rep. 292],
stated that '' '. . . The element of gambling that is necessary
to constitute this a lottery within the purview of the statute,
to wit, the paying of money, directly or indirectly, for the
chance of drawing the piano, is lacking, and the transaction
did not constitute a violation of the statute.' ''
Plaintiffs and amicus curiae both argue that People v. Gonzales, 62 Cal.App.2d 274 [144 P.2d 605], laid down the rule
that a closed participation program and thus a lottery exists
where the distribution of tickets to persons other than customers is not ''substantial'' or is ''negligible'' in comparison
with those distributed to customers. This rule, it is contended, has "emasculated" the holding of People v. Cardas,
137 Cal.App.Supp. 788 [28 P.2d 99]. In view of the holding
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in People v. Carpenter, 141 Cal.App.2d 884, 889, 890 [297
P.2d 498], that "Certainly those who registered upon request
of a solicitor without attending the theater did not pay for
the chance of getting the prize; neither did those who later
registered without purchasing an admission ticket. Those
who purchased admission tickets and then registered while
they were at the theater as patrons, caunot be said to have
paid a consideration for the privilege of registering, as they
could have done so without buying an admission ticket,'' it
would appear that this argument is without merit. If any
person could receive a ticket or tickets without paying anything therefor, it would appear that the question of consideration should not rest on the percentage of those receiving
tickets with purchases as opposed to those receiving tickets
without such purchases.
Reliance is also placed on Holmes v. Saunders, 114 Cal.App.
2d 389, 390, 391 [250 P.2d 269], where tickets for a drawing
where an automobile was the prize, were distributed to all
those who paid $1.00 for a six months' subscription to the
"Associated Bulletin." It was there said : "The consideration to make such a transaction a lottery need not be paid
exclusively for the chance to win the prize. It is sufficient
that the consideration, as here, be paid for something else and
the chance to win the prize. (People v. Gonzales, 62 Cal.App.2d
274 [144 P.2d 605] ; People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44 [2 N.E.2d
38] ; and see the many cases collected in the notes in 48
A.L.R. 1115; 57 A.L.R. 424; 103 A.I,.R. 866; 109 A.L.R. 709;
113 A.L.R. 1121.) It is said in 34 American Jurisprudence
650 'that no sooner is the term "lottery" defined by a court,
than ingenuity evolves some scheme within the mischief discussed, although not quite within the letter of the definition
given; but an examination of the many cases on the subject
will show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the
most ingenious and subtle mind to devise any scheme or plan,
short of a gratuitous distribution of property, which has not
been held by the courts of this country to be in violation of
the lottery laws. . . . The court will inquire, not into the
name, but into the game, however skillfully disguised, in
order to ascertain if it is prohibited .... ' ''
Several cases from other states are cited by the People in
an endeavor to show that the promotional scheme here involved did constitute a lottery. One somewhat factually
similar is Featherstone v. Independent Service Stations Assn.,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 10 S.W.2d 124, 125, 126, 127, where a prize
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ticket was distributed for each $1.00 spent by a customer of
a service station. Apparently the plan was changed and
some tickets were distributed to persons who did not make purchases of merchandise or service. The 'l'exas court noted that
a lottery was not defined by the laws of Texas and adopted
the definition set forth in State v. L1'pkin, 169 N.C. 265 [84
S.E. 340, 342, L.R.A. 1915F 1018, Ann.Cas. 1917D 137] :
"A lottery, for all practical purposes may be defined as any
scheme for the distribution of prizes, by lot or chance, by which
one, on paying money or giving any other thing of value to
another, obtains a token, which entitles him to receive a
larger or smaller value or nothing, as some formula of chance
may determine.'' The court said: ''While dealers, under the
new plan, distributed tickets to noncustomers as well as to
customers, it seems that the scheme was to distribute tickets,
in the main to customers, as the evidence discloses that only
a few, negligible in number, were given to persons other
than customers. That the giving of tickets, and the drawings
and distribution of prizes, were inducements to patronage
and unquestionably lured customers, is shown from the very
satisfactory business results that followed. Patronage thus
induced was the consideration that passed from the ticket
holder for the chance received, in that the price paid, whatever it was, the amount being immaterial, constituted the aggregate price for the merchandise or service and the ticket
that represented a chance to win the prize; in other words,
for one undivided price both were purchased, the merchandise, or service, and ticket, the ticket being as much bought
as though priced separately." (Emphasis added.) In other
words, the court held that the benefit flowing to the sponsor of
the scheme was the consideration which made the scheme a
lottery. [13] The Cardas case, su.pra, held that "The question of consideration is not to be determined from the standpoint of the defendant, but from that of the holders of the
prize tickets'' and section 319 very clearly so states: That
it is the distribution of property by chance ''among persons
who have paid or promised to pay any valuable consideration
for the chance of obtaining such property or a portion of it."
The People also cite Federal Commttnications Com. v.
American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 293, 294 [74 S.Ct.
593, 98 L.Ed. 699], where radio give-away programs were
involved. The statute there involved (18 U.S.C. § 1304) provided: "Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio station
for which a license is required by any law of the United
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States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly
permits the broadcasting, of, any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon
lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by
means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether
said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be
fined .... " Examples of the give-away programs were listed
as "Stop the Music," "What's My Name" and "Sing it
Again." The court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, stated that the Federal Communications Commission
"contends that consideration in the form of money or a thing
of value is not essential, and that a commercial benefit to the
promoter satisfies the consideration requirement . . . " and
that the section involved did not define the type of consideration necessary. The court held : "We find no decisions
precisely in point on the facts of the cases before us. The
courts have defined consideration in various ways, but so far
as we are aware none has ever held that a contestant's listening at home to a radio or television program satisfies the consideration requirement. Some courts-with vigorous protest
from others-have held that the requirement is satisfied by a
'raffle' scheme giving free chances to persons who go to a
store to register in order to participate in the drawing of a
prize, and similarly by a 'bank night' scheme giving free
chances to persons who gather in front of a motion picture
theater in order to participate in a drawing held for the
primary benefit of the said patrons of the theatre. But such
cases differ substantially from the cases before us. To be
eligible for a prize on the 'give-away' programs involved here,
not a single home contestant is required to purchase anything
or pay an admission price or leave his home to visit the promoter's place of business; the only effort required for participation is listening." (Emphasis added.) The People rely
on the italicized portion of the above-quoted statement as
a holding that when a participant is required to go to the
sponsor's place of business to deposit his prize ticket stub the
necessary consideration is established. The Supreme Court
also noted that "\Ve believe that it would be stretching the
statute to the breaking point to give it an interpretation that
would make such programs a crime.'' [14] In view of our
statute (Pen. Code, § 319) defining a lottery and which provides that the consideration necessary is a "valuable one"
paid, or promised to be paid by the one receiving the ticket,
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the fact that a ticket holder must go to the place of business
of the sponsor of the scheme to deposit the ticket stub cannot
be considered the necessary consideration.
We are also urged by the People to consider section 1605
of the Civil Code in defining the consideration necessary
under the lottery statutes. That section provides that ''Any
benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully
entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or agreed to be suffered,
by such person, other than such as he is at the time of consent
lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is
a good consideration for a promise." It would again appear
that, in view of the plain provisions of section 319 of the Penal
Code, in order to constitute consideration within the definition
of a lottery there must be a valuable consideration paid, or
promised to be paid by the ticket holder. (People v. Carpenter, 141 Cal.App.2d 884 [297 P.2d 498].) [15] We held in
De Mille v. American Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 139, 156
[187 P.2d 769, 175 A.L.R. 382], that "Penal statutes will not
be given application beyond their plain intent. Such acts
include only those offenses coming clearly within the import
of the language.'' [16] The ''realistic approach'' to the
c<msideration necessary to constitute a promotion scheme a
lottery which is urged upon us by the People in asking us to
accept the definition of consideration as found in section 1605
of the Civil Code would seem to be an argument which should
be directed to the Legislature rather than to this court.
[17] It is our conclusion that defendants' advertising and
promotional scheme did not fall within the definition of a
lottery as set forth in section 319 of the Penal Code because
of the lack of consideration.
The portions of the judgment appealed from are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.

